To most thoughtful people, unemployment benefit embodies a painful trade-off. It's the mark of a civilised society, clubbing together to provide assistance to those in need. It is also, regrettably, an incentive to remain unemployed. At its worst, unemployment benefit pays people to watch daytime television; it is particularly pernicious if the skills of the jobless decay, and unemployment becomes unemployability. Yet, at its best, it is a life-saver.

　　對(duì)多數(shù)有識(shí)之士而言，失業(yè)救濟(jì)體現(xiàn)了一種痛苦的權(quán)衡。它是文明社會(huì)的標(biāo)志，大家攜起手來為那些需要的人提供幫助。但令人遺憾的是，它也刺激了人們保持失業(yè)狀態(tài)。在最壞的情況下，失業(yè)救濟(jì)為那些大白天看電視的人提供了酬勞，尤其危險(xiǎn)的是，如果失業(yè)者的技能退化，失業(yè)就變成了無就業(yè)能力。不過，在最好的情況下，它能夠挽救失業(yè)者的生活。

　　In balancing these two effects, it's hardly surprising that different societies have adopted very different systems. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, member governments spent an average of 0.75 per cent of gross domestic product on unemployment benefits in 2006. France spent nearly twice this sum, and Germany almost three times as much, while the US spent a third of the average, and the UK just over a quarter. Germany spent more than 10 times as much as the UK, relative to GDP.

　　在平衡這兩種效應(yīng)時(shí)，不同的社會(huì)采取了截然不同的做法，這幾乎不令人驚訝。根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織(OECD)的數(shù)據(jù)，2006年，各成員國(guó)政府用在失業(yè) 救濟(jì)上的平均花費(fèi)占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的0.75%。法國(guó)的比例幾乎是這個(gè)數(shù)字的兩倍，德國(guó)將近三倍，而美國(guó)是平均數(shù)字的三分之一，英國(guó)僅四分之一 強(qiáng)。德國(guó)失業(yè)救濟(jì)金占GDP的比例，是英國(guó)的10倍以上。

　　Paying people to stay out of work is an example of that increasingly familiar phenomenon, "moral hazard", but moral hazard can be more fearsome in the theorist's imagination than it is in reality. Does unemployment benefit really encourage people to duck work? Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that it does: increases in benefits have repeatedly been linked with longer periods between jobs.

　　為不工作的人支付報(bào)酬是"道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)"的一個(gè)例子，人們對(duì)于這種現(xiàn)象越來越熟悉。但理論家想象中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，可能比現(xiàn)實(shí)中更為可怕。失業(yè)救濟(jì)真的鼓勵(lì)人們逃避工作嗎?不幸地是，有證據(jù)表明確實(shí)如此：在很多情況下，失業(yè)救濟(jì)金的上升與兩次就業(yè)之間的間隔時(shí)期延長(zhǎng)存在關(guān)系。

　　But new research from Raj Chetty, a young Berkeley economist, suggests that moral hazard may not be why more generous benefits seem to lead to more unemployment. Chetty realised that unemployment benefit does not merely pay people to stay out of work; it also protects them from having to rush into an unsuitable job. It is nothing to celebrate if unemployed engineers cannot afford to spend three months finding a job for which they are qualified, but are forced to work as estate agents to put food on the table. A longer gap between jobs is sometimes preferable.

　　但是，加州大學(xué)伯克利分校年輕的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家拉吉?切迪(Raj Chetty)的最新研究顯示，道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能并非更慷慨的失業(yè)救濟(jì)導(dǎo)致更多失業(yè)的原因。切迪認(rèn)為，失業(yè)救濟(jì)不僅為失業(yè)者提供了收入，同時(shí)使他們免于匆忙從 事一份不合適自己的工作。如果失業(yè)的工程師花不起3個(gè)月的時(shí)間尋找稱職的工作，而是被迫去當(dāng)一名房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人來維持生計(jì)，那也沒有什么值得慶賀的。在某些 情況下，兩次就業(yè)之間的間隔時(shí)期延長(zhǎng)是可取的。

　　This is an interesting theory, but distinguishing between moral hazard and the effect of having some cash to hand is tough. Chetty looked at sharp breaks in the unemployment insurance rules in the US, comparing one state's rules with another's, or examining moments when the rules changed. One suggestive finding is that when unemployment insurance becomes more generous, not everybody lingers on benefits. The median job-loser in the US has $200 when he loses his job and is unlikely to be able to borrow much, but some people have plenty of money in the bank when they find themselves unemployed. Chetty found that those with savings do not take any longer to find a job when paid more generous benefits, while those with little in the kitty when they lose their jobs do. This suggests that those without their own cash reserves are using unemployment benefits to buy themselves time to find the right job.

　　這是一個(gè)有趣的理論，但是將道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與手頭有一些現(xiàn)金可花的效應(yīng)區(qū)別開相當(dāng)困難。切迪研究了美國(guó)失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)制度的明顯改變，將各州的制度進(jìn)行比較，或研究制 度改變時(shí)的狀況。一個(gè)具有提示性的發(fā)現(xiàn)是：當(dāng)失業(yè)救濟(jì)金增加時(shí)，并非所有人都對(duì)此留戀不舍。美國(guó)失業(yè)者的救濟(jì)金中值為200美元，他們不太可能借到很多 錢，但有些人失業(yè)時(shí)，在銀行有大量的存款。切迪發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些有存款的人在救濟(jì)金更高的時(shí)候，不愿意失業(yè)太長(zhǎng)時(shí)間，而那些沒有多少存款的人，則愿意等上更長(zhǎng)的 時(shí)間。這表明，那些自己沒有現(xiàn)金儲(chǔ)備的人正利用失業(yè)救濟(jì)，讓自己有充足的時(shí)間去尋找合適的工作。

　　Of course, there may be many differences between people with savings and those without, so this merely suggests that Chetty is on to something. But there are other clues - for instance, Chetty and two colleagues looked at the system in Austria, where severance pay is due to anyone employed for more than three years. By looking at - for example - a factory closure in which lots of staff are fired simultaneously, they could treat severance pay almost as a randomised experiment. Those lucky enough to get severance pay spent more time looking for a new job, despite the fact that severance pay provides no direct incentive to stay out of work.

　　當(dāng)然，有存款的人與沒有存款的人的情況可能有很多不同，因此這只是表明，切迪發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些東西。但還有其他一些線索，比如，切迪和兩位同事研究了奧地利的制 度，該國(guó)任何就業(yè)三年以上的雇員都有解雇費(fèi)。舉例來說，在觀察一家工廠倒閉、大量工人同時(shí)被裁掉時(shí)，他們可能把解雇費(fèi)作為一種隨機(jī)實(shí)驗(yàn)。那些足夠幸運(yùn)的家 伙利用解雇費(fèi)來花費(fèi)更多的時(shí)間尋找一份新工作，盡管事實(shí)上，解雇費(fèi)并沒有直接鼓勵(lì)人們不工作。

　　Unemployment benefit does encourage unemployment in the short term; but that may be no bad thing.

　　短期內(nèi)，失業(yè)救濟(jì)確實(shí)鼓勵(lì)了失業(yè)，但這可能不是壞事。