Chinese policy makers have acted for the last year and a half as if their inflation problem could be solved easily while growth continues to tick along at 8% or faster. Now they are starting to realize that the problem is more serious. But they still misunderstand why China is overheating. The root cause is a massive increase in the money supply over the past two years that is still filtering through the economy.

　　中國決策者過去一年半的種種行為都似乎表明，他們可在經濟繼續(xù)以8%甚至更高速度增長的同時，輕易解決通貨膨脹問題。如今他們開始意識到，這個問題比預想得更為嚴重，但卻仍對經濟過熱的根源存在誤解。其實，真正的原因在于過去兩年中國大幅增加貨幣供應，這些供應目前仍在不斷向實體經濟滲透。

　　Data released last Friday showed consumer prices in March rose by 5.4% year-on-year, the highest in three years. And there's more yet to come, as Beijing was too slow to start cooling China's red hot economy. Being too slow means that unless policy makers bring real GDP growth sharply below trend, China is at risk of runaway inflation.

　　上周五發(fā)布的經濟數據顯示，3月份消費者價格指數(CPI)同比上升5.4%，為三年來最高升幅。由于中國政府在為過熱的經濟降溫方面出手太慢，通脹率尚未達到峰值。這里的出手太慢意味著，除非決策者讓中國GDP的實際增長率大幅降至近年來的一般增速以下，否則中國就可能面臨通脹失控的風險。

　　There is a tendency among Chinese policy makers to attribute the cause of inflation to supply-side factors, like bad weather that creates food shortages. But the real cause is Beijing's stimulus plan after China's economy plunged into recession in late 2008. The increase in broad money as a share of GDP was close to 40% in 2009 and the first half of 2010, much higher than the previous peak of 27% in 2003.

　　Getty Images上個月，中國總理溫家寶在北京出席一次新聞發(fā)布會。中國決策者傾向于把通脹原因歸咎為供應方面的因素，如造成糧食短缺的惡劣天氣等。但真正的原因在于北京方面為應對2008年末中國陷入經濟衰退而出臺的經濟刺激方案。廣義貨幣供應量的增長在2009年和2010年上半年占GDP的比重接近40%，遠遠高于2003年占比27%的峰值。

　　Beijing's monetary boost certainly revived growth. The rebound that started in the spring of 2009 was spectacular, but within just a couple of quarters the economy had overheated. By the middle of 2009 inflation began to accelerate, and it did so on all fronts. Consumer prices, property prices and wages all began to rise at a faster pace. Against this evidence, it is hard to argue that inflation in China has been anything else but a monetary phenomenon.

　　中國政府增加貨幣供應量的做法無疑提振了經濟增長。中國經濟于2009年春天開始了強勁復蘇，但僅在幾個季度內就開始變得過熱。到2009年中期，通脹開始在各個領域加速。消費品價格、房價和工資全都開始以更高的速度增長。以此來看，很難說中國的通脹不是一種貨幣現象。

　　The dangers of this monetary excess are becoming evident. China may be on the brink of a vicious wage-inflation spiral, which could undermine the authorities' grip over the economy. Actual inflation could well be higher than the official 5.4% in March. That's why Beijing is now hurriedly tightening. Still, this policy action comes too late in the day: Inflation had been on the rise for over a year and real deposit rates had been negative for nearly a year before the authorities began a meaningful withdrawal of the monetary stimulus.

　　貨幣供應過多帶來的種種危害正在逐一顯現。中國可能正處于一種惡性的工資-通脹螺旋式上升的邊緣，而這種形式的上升可能不利于當局對經濟的控制。3月份實際通脹率很可能高于官方通報的5.4%，這也是當前中國政府忙不迭地實行緊縮政策的原因。盡管如此，它的行動還是開始得太晚了。通脹率一年多來不斷上升，而實際存款利率在有關當局開始真正退出貨幣刺激政策之前，已有近一年都為負值。

　　It is important to trace the monetary impetus to inflation through the stages of the business cycle to understand what the delayed policy response now means for growth. An economy is overheated and inflation starts to rise if the level of actual output is above the economy's potential. Potential output can be defined on the basis of a given degree of spare capacity: Wherever there is a tradeoff between higher output and higher prices, essentially some capacity must remain idle. The closer an economy approaches the full use of its limited resources, the more prices rise to pull unused resources into production.

　　為了理解政策反應滯后對經濟增長意味著什么，很重要的一點就是要追蹤在商業(yè)周期的不同階段貨幣供應對通脹水平的推動作用。如果一國的實際產出超過其潛在產出，這個國家就會出現經濟過熱，通貨膨脹也會開始抬頭。對潛在產出的定義可以一定水平的閑置生產能力為依據。只要產出和價格之間存在相互推動、交替上升的現象，基本上就可以說，一定有某些生產能力被閑置。一個經濟體越是不斷接近其有限資源被完全利用的水平，就有越來越多的商品通過提價的方式來把那些未經利用的資源投入生產。

　　There was spare capacity in the economy in late 2008 and early 2009, because the external demand that kept China's factories chugging had slumped, pushing the economy into recession. So actual output fell below potential, and annual inflation slowed quickly, turning negative in early 2009. By mid-2009, growth had rebounded strongly and spare capacity started getting used up, with too many yuan chasing too few goods and services. By the fall of 2009 the level of actual output was already above the economy's potential and has stayed there since. If the tightening had begun then, inflation wouldn't have gotten as bad.

　　2008年末和2009年初，中國就曾出現過閑置生產能力，這是由于以前維持中國工廠滿負荷運轉的外部需求突然大幅減少，中國經濟隨即陷入衰退，實際產出低于潛在產出，年均通脹率的升幅迅速放緩，并在2009年初變?yōu)樨撝怠Ｈ欢?009年中期，中國經濟增長開始強勁反彈，閑置生產能力也開始被完全利用，出現了過多的人民幣追逐過少的產品和服務的現象。到2009年秋季，實際產出水平已經超過了經濟潛能，并一直延續(xù)至今。如果在那時中國政府就開始收緊政策，通脹問題不會失控到今天這個地步。

　　The good news is that the recent tightening efforts may have begun to bite. On a three-month annualized basis, a better guide to recent trends, broad money, or M2, growth slowed to 8.4% in March from as high as 28.5% last October. China published quarterly real GDP growth for the first time last Friday, showing growth slowed to 2.1% in the first quarter of this calendar year from 2.4% in the fourth quarter last year. Lombard Street Research estimates its own quarterly real GDP growth for China, which suggests that the official data could be understating the extent of the slowdown in the first quarter.

　　好消息是，近來中國政府做出的緊縮努力可能已開始初見成效。廣義貨幣供應(M2)可以幫助我們更好地看清最近的趨勢。按每季度的年化統(tǒng)計數據來看，中國的廣義貨幣供應從去年10月高達28.5%的增長率已放慢至今年3月的8.4%。上周五，中國第一次發(fā)布了有關GDP季度實際增長率的統(tǒng)計數據。數據顯示，中國實際GDP增長率從去年第四季度的2.4%減緩至今年第一季度的2.1%。宏觀經濟預測顧問公司Lombard Street Research對中國GDP季度實際增長率做了自己的估測，結果表明，官方數據可能對今年第一季度經濟增長放緩的程度有所淡化。

　　Beijing seems serious about winning the battle with inflation. Policy makers have also shown that they understand the need for China's growth model to move away from the credit-fuelled investment binges of the past, and that this means structurally lower growth. The question is, how prepared is Beijing to accept much slower growth and its social and political consequences?

　　中國政府似乎有很大的決心，一定要贏得抗通脹斗爭的勝利。另外，決策者也表現出，他們知道中國的增長模式需擺脫過去那種信貸推動的投資熱，并且知道這種模式的轉變意味著改變中國經濟的內在結構，放慢經濟增長速度。但問題是，面對經濟增速大大放緩以及隨之而來的社會和政治問題，中國準備好了嗎？