The Federal Reserve is just days away from ending one of the major steps to aid the U.S. economy─but the effort has done little to solve the original problem: The government and individuals alike are still heavily in debt.

　　美聯(lián)儲離結(jié)束其幫助美國經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇的一項重大舉措的最后期限只剩幾天的時間了，但這項措施基本未能解決本質(zhì)問題：美國政府和個人仍然負(fù)債累累。

　　Around the globe, the inability of governments and households to reduce their debt continues to cast a shadow over Western economies and the financial health of individuals. Today, U.S. consumers have more mortgage and credit-card debt than they did five years ago, and the U.S. budget deficit is worsening. At the same time, European governments are having to throw billions more euros at Greece to keep it afloat.

　　放眼全球，各國政府和家庭無力減輕債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)的現(xiàn)實繼續(xù)給西方經(jīng)濟體以及個人的財務(wù)狀況蒙上了一層陰影。今天，美國消費者比五年前背負(fù)更多抵押貸款和信用卡債務(wù)，美國的預(yù)算赤字還在惡化。與此同時，歐洲各國政府不得不繼續(xù)砸進數(shù)十億歐元，為的只是能避免希臘破產(chǎn)。

The repercussions are likely to play out for years to come in the form of patchy economic growth, further government market intervention─such as last week's decision by oil-consuming nations to release more oil onto the markets─and frequent financial-market swings.

　　債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)過重的后果有可能在今后幾年以各種形式漸漸表現(xiàn)出來：經(jīng)濟增長不均勻；政府加強對市場的干預(yù)（比如上周石油消費國決定向市場釋放戰(zhàn)略石油儲備）；金融市場頻繁動蕩。

The fundamental problem is that reversing the trend of piling on the debt requires some combination of cutting spending, growing income or the economy, and inflation. But wage growth is stagnant and home prices, which underpin much of the debt problem, are still falling.

　　根本問題在于，想要逆轉(zhuǎn)債務(wù)堆積的趨勢，需要一系列舉措的配合：削減開支；增加收入并促進經(jīng)濟增長；應(yīng)對通脹。但目前的現(xiàn)狀是，工資增長停滯；構(gòu)成債務(wù)問題主要原因的房價卻仍然在下跌。

　　Meanwhile, in a vicious circle, businesses aren't hiring or investing because they know consumers are tapped out. Banks, for their part, are hoarding cash, being stingy with new loans.

　　與此同時，一個惡性循環(huán)出現(xiàn)了：企業(yè)不愿雇工或投資，因為他們知道消費者囊中羞澀；銀行則寧可守著現(xiàn)金也不愿放出新的貸款。

　　Unlike the aftermath of typical recessions, simply lowering interest rates hasn't been enough to get growth back on track, economists say. Central-bank efforts have boosted financial markets in the short term─raising stock prices and significantly lowering interest rates─but they have been unable to push people and governments to whittle down debt.

　　經(jīng)濟學(xué)家說，通常衰退過后只要降低利率就能讓經(jīng)濟增長回到正軌。可這一次僅僅這么做就不夠了。中央銀行推出的舉措短期內(nèi)提振了金融市場：股價上升，利率大幅降低。但央行卻沒有辦法讓政府和個人逐漸削減債務(wù)。

　　Quite the opposite has been the case. The lowered cost of borrowing has enabled individuals and governments to delay taking measures to change the way they spend and save.

　　事與愿違的是，借貸成本的降低使個人和政府并不急著采取措施改變他們的消費和儲蓄習(xí)慣。

　　Given the difficulties of paying down debt, "you have to get comfortable with the idea that it's going to take a long time for the markets to adjust and the economy to get back on solid footing," says Tom Luster, director of investment-grade-bond research at Eaton Vance Investment Managers.

　　財富管理公司Eaton Vance Investment Managers的投資級債券研究總監(jiān)拉斯特（Tom Luster）說，由于償還債務(wù)并不容易，你得適應(yīng)這樣一種情況，即市場做出調(diào)整且經(jīng)濟重新企穩(wěn)需要很長的時間。

　　Carmen Reinhart, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has said that the experience of past financial crises suggests the unwinding of debt on average takes seven years, with debt ratios not coming down significantly until three years after a crisis.

　　彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所（Peterson Institute for International Economics）高級研究員卡門•萊因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）說，過去幾次金融危機的經(jīng)驗表明，想要完全甩掉債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)平均需要七年的時間，危機發(fā)生后的頭三年負(fù)債比率不會顯著下降。

　　"The issue with debt is you can't get rid of it quickly and you can"t get rid of it nicely," Ms. Reinhart says.

　　萊因哈特說，問題在于你無法很快且令人滿意地甩掉債務(wù)包袱。

　　Ms. Reinhart looked at 15 post-World War II financial crises and found that seven involved a double-dip back into recession. She says the current economic weakness highlights a feature of the post-financial-crisis landscape that investors and businesses need to become accustomed to: "The ability to absorb shocks that you normally could withstand…is much more limited," she says.

　　萊因哈特仔細(xì)研究了二戰(zhàn)以后15次金融危機的情況，發(fā)現(xiàn)其中七次都涉及雙底衰退（即W型復(fù)蘇）。她說目前經(jīng)濟疲軟凸顯了金融危機過后經(jīng)濟格局的一種特征，即投資者和企業(yè)必須習(xí)慣以下現(xiàn)象：其承受一般性沖擊的能力會大大受到影響。

　　"If your household is already feeling the weight of an underwater mortgage…you're going to feel differently about adding more debt to absorb the cost of gas," Ms. Reinhart says.

　　萊因哈特說，如果因為房價下跌，你的按揭貸款住宅已經(jīng)是負(fù)資產(chǎn)了，那么因油價上升而造成更多負(fù)債，你對此的感受肯定是和別人不一樣的。

　　Since the autumn of 2008 there have been repeated attempts by central banks and governments to cushion the blow of the debt-cutting process. In the U.S., efforts included the Fed's first round of so-called quantitative easing, in which the Fed essentially printed money through purchases of more than $1 trillion of mortgage-backed securities. There have been multiple rounds of stimulus by the federal government. The European Central Bank, along with the Bank of England, also employed quantitative easing.

　　自2008年秋天以來，各國央行和政府多次嘗試降低債務(wù)減縮造成的沖擊。美國推出的舉措包括被稱作第一輪量化寬松的貨幣政策。從本質(zhì)上講，這是美聯(lián)儲通過印鈔購買總值超過1萬億美元的抵押貸款支持證券。聯(lián)邦政府也已經(jīng)推出了好幾輪刺激計劃。歐洲央行和英國央行也采取了量化寬松的做法。

　　This week the Fed is set to end its second round of quantitative easing, known as "QE2," which pumped $600 billion into the financial markets since last autumn. All told, the Fed has flooded the markets with roughly $2 trillion since August 2008.

　　按照計劃，本周美聯(lián)儲將結(jié)束第二輪量化寬松政策（即QE2）。自去年秋天以來美聯(lián)儲通過本輪量化寬松已經(jīng)向金融市場注入6,000億美元的資金。如果算上2008年8月后推出的第一輪量化寬松，美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)總計向市場注入了大約2萬億美元。

　　Yet U.S. consumers have 37% more credit-card, auto and other nonmortgage debt than a decade ago, before adjusting for inflation, according to the Fed. That is down 6% from its peak of $2.6 trillion hit in September 2008, but most of that decline took place within the first 12 months. Over the past year, consumer credit has been essentially flat at around $2.4 trillion.

　　據(jù)美聯(lián)儲透露，美國消費者信用卡、車貸以及其它非抵押貸款債務(wù)的總額比10年前高出37%（未經(jīng)通脹因素調(diào)整）。這一數(shù)字較2008年9月創(chuàng)下的最高記錄2.6萬億美元下降了6%，但債務(wù)總量的下降主要是在金融危機出現(xiàn)后的頭12個月內(nèi)發(fā)生的。過去一年，消費信貸大致保持在2.4萬億美元的水平。

　　The news is especially grim when it comes to mortgage debt. Nearly 23% of mortgages are underwater, according to data compiled by J.P. Morgan Chase. Meanwhile, there is still more mortgage debt outstanding than there was five years ago, roughly $9.9 trillion, according to the Fed. The result is consumers find it harder to tap home-equity credit lines or sell their houses.

　　當(dāng)涉及抵押貸款債務(wù)時，這一消息就顯得尤其嚴(yán)峻了。摩根大通（J.P. Morgan Chase）匯編的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，近23%的抵押貸款出現(xiàn)資不抵債的情況。與此同時，據(jù)美聯(lián)儲數(shù)據(jù)，未償付的抵押貸款債務(wù)總額高于五年前，約為9.9萬億美元。其結(jié)果就是消費者更難申請房屋凈值貸款、也更難出售房屋。

　　Pumping money into the financial system "doesn't stop the need for the private sector to heal itself," says Dominic Wilson, chief global-markets economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. "We're still facing the headwinds of an economy that is struggling to get on its feet without stimulus."

　　高盛集團（Goldman Sachs Group Inc.）首席全球市場經(jīng)濟學(xué)家威爾遜（Dominic Wilson）說，向金融體系注入資金不能取代私營部門自愈的需要。當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟仍然難以在不借助經(jīng)濟刺激的情況下實現(xiàn)增長，給我們造成了很大的阻礙。

　　On the fiscal front, the outlook is worsening. The U.S. government debt-to-GDP ratio will hit 100% this year, up from 62% in 2007, according to the IMF

　　財政狀況的前景也在惡化。據(jù)國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）透露，美國政府債務(wù)與GDP的比率今年將達到100%，2007年這一比率還只有62%。

　　The core of Europe is seeing fiscal balances worsening as well. Germany's debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to be 80% this year, up from 65% in 2008. France will reach 88%, up from 64%, according to the IMF.

　　歐洲主要國家的財政狀況也在惡化。據(jù)IMF透露，今年德國債務(wù)對GDP比率預(yù)計將達到80%，高于2008年65%的水平。法國的這一比率也將從64%上升到88%。

　　The Congressional Budget Office last week forecast that the amount of government debt will reach its highest point relative to the size of the economy since just after World War II.

　　 國會預(yù)算辦公室（Congressional Budget Office）上周預(yù)測，相對于經(jīng)濟規(guī)模來說，政府債務(wù)的規(guī)模將達到自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來的最高水平。

　　This environment is a stark contrast to the so-called "Great Moderation" of the late 1980s and 1990s when economic ups and downs were shallower. That economic resiliency "had a lot to do with increased ability to access the credit markets," says Jason DeSena Trennert, chief investment strategist at Strategas Research Partners. "Without the benefits of that cushion…the volatility of economic growth is going to be greater."

　　當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境和上世紀(jì)80年代末以及90年代出現(xiàn)的所謂“大緩和”（Great Moderation）形成了鮮明對比。當(dāng)時經(jīng)濟的上下波動沒有這么劇烈。機構(gòu)經(jīng)紀(jì)商Strategas Research Partners首席投資策略師特倫納特（Jason DeSena Trennert）說，當(dāng)時經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇的能力較強和信貸市場能夠發(fā)揮更大作用有著很大的關(guān)系。失去這個緩沖機制帶來的好處，經(jīng)濟增長的波動將會加大。

　　The uneven economic performance is translating into frequent sharp reversals of sentiment in markets. Goldman's Mr. Wilson says it is most evident in the short-term bond markets.

　　不均衡的經(jīng)濟正表現(xiàn)為市場情緒的劇烈波動。高盛的威爾遜說，這一點在短期債券市場最為明顯。

　　"It's definitely a start-and-stop flavor for the markets," says Mr. Wilson.

　　威爾遜說，這種情況肯定會讓市場時好時壞。

　　Another effect is that interest rates could stay exceptionally low for much longer than would usually be the case, says former World Bank official and author Liaquat Ahamed, whose book Lords of Finance examined monetary policy in the 1920s and 1930s. He notes rates have been essentially zero in Japan since 1995 and that during the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve cut the discount rate to below 2% in 1934 and it held at those levels until the mid-1950s.

　　世界銀行（World Bank）前任官員、作家艾哈邁德（Liaquat Ahamed）說，另一個影響是，相比正常情況，超低利率持續(xù)的時間可能會長得多。他的作品《金融列王記》（Lords of Finance）回顧了上世紀(jì)20至30年代的貨幣政策。艾哈邁德指出，自1995年以來，日本實際上一直在實施零利率政策。大蕭條期間，美聯(lián)儲在1934年將貼現(xiàn)率降到2%以下，并一直維持到上世紀(jì)50年代中期。

　　History shows "that when people have borrowed too much, they stop borrowing and interest rates stay very low for a very long time," he says. "So you can forget about investing in bonds."

　　艾哈邁德說，歷史證明，當(dāng)人們負(fù)債累累時，大家停止借貸，利率將在長時間內(nèi)停留在超低水平。所以就別去想投資債券了。