Years ago, when Industrial & Commercial Bank of China was getting ready to list, it went through its own spring cleaning of its balance sheet. It established Huarong Asset Management, a platform to take all its bad debts, while the Ministry of Finance recapitalised the bank itself.

　　多年前，當(dāng)中國(guó)工商銀行(ICBC)準(zhǔn)備上市時(shí)，對(duì)自身的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表進(jìn)行了一場(chǎng)“春季大掃除”，成立了華融資產(chǎn)管理公司(Huarong Asset Management)，作為接收其全部壞賬的平臺(tái)，同時(shí)，中國(guó)財(cái)政部對(duì)該行進(jìn)行了資本重組。

　　Today, Huarong has reinvented itself as a non-bank financial institution. Its Hong Kong affiliate is busy making loans to those who can not borrow in China directly from ICBC itself, albeit at much higher rates of up to 20 per cent per year, thanks to introductions from the big Chinese bank.

　　如今，華融已經(jīng)改頭換面，成為一家非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)。在中國(guó)無(wú)法直接從工行貸到款的人，在這家大行的推介之下，紛紛轉(zhuǎn)向華融在香港的分支機(jī)構(gòu)貸款，不過(guò)利率要高出許多，年息最高達(dá)20%。

　　Many of Huarong’s borrowers are second-tier property developers who can’t get credit at home as China tries to slow a rise in property prices which threaten social stability.

　　華融的許多貸款者是二線房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商，由于中國(guó)正力圖平抑已危及社會(huì)穩(wěn)定的房?jī)r(jià)漲勢(shì)，這些開(kāi)發(fā)商在國(guó)內(nèi)貸不到款。

　　Usually, these borrowers are able to get the money back across the border into China.

　　通常而言，這些貸款者都能夠把錢(qián)弄過(guò)境，帶回內(nèi)地。

　　So the platform that was originally created to deal with ICBC’s problem loans may well now be creating the next round of problem loans instead.

　　于是，這個(gè)原本為了處置工行不良貸款而創(chuàng)建的平臺(tái)，如今很可能正在制造下一波不良貸款。

　　Such concerns are one reason that bank shares are down 10 per cent this month and trading is at all time lows in terms of price-to-book value, according to GaveKal Dragonomics.

　　GaveKal Dragonomics表示，上述擔(dān)憂是銀行股本月下跌10%、按市凈率計(jì)處于歷史最低位的原因之一。

　　Analysts disagree on the extent to which Chinese regulators have succeeded in putting a stop to the breakneck lending of the past two years. But fears linger that China will careen from the overheated pace of investment of the past two years to the opposite extreme in which companies cannot get any credit. That outcome would have dire consequences for the macro economy.

　　對(duì)于中國(guó)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在遏制近兩年的放貸狂潮上取得了多大成功，分析師們莫衷一是。但人們一直擔(dān)心，中國(guó)可能從最近兩年的投資過(guò)熱轉(zhuǎn)向另一個(gè)極端，即企業(yè)完全貸不到款。這種結(jié)果將給宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)造成可怕影響。

　　But lack of credit is not yet the problem. Credit is still flowing in China, although at a slower pace and with a higher cost, thanks to non-banks in Hong Kong such as Huarong.

　　不過(guò)，眼下尚未出現(xiàn)信貸短缺問(wèn)題。在中國(guó)，信貸仍在涌動(dòng)，盡管速度有所放緩，而且拜香港的非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)（如華融）所賜，成本有所上升。

　　Bank credit in Hong Kong stands at 240 per cent of gross domestic product, according to data from JPMorgan, mostly reflecting the arrival of Chinese borrowers circumventing restrictions at home. In mainland China itself the figure is 120 per cent.

　　根據(jù)摩根大通(JPMorgan)的數(shù)據(jù)，香港的銀行信貸占本地生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)比例為240%。這主要反映出許多中國(guó)貸款者繞開(kāi)內(nèi)地限制措施，前來(lái)香港借貸的事實(shí)。中國(guó)內(nèi)地的這一比例為120%。

　　The current problem is just how much money is going to the high-end property market, precisely because China depends so heavily on the property market for its economic growth – and how little is going to more productive small and medium enterprises.

　　當(dāng)前問(wèn)題在于：有多少資金正流向高端房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)？因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)對(duì)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的依賴程度極高。另一方面，流向更具生產(chǎn)力的中小企業(yè)的資金到底少到什么程度？

　　A big part of the Chinese miracle has to do with the fact that over this past decade China’s economic expansion was driven by quality growth that came from making things that the rest of the world wanted to buy at a price that no other country could match. That was because Chinese labour was both cheap and productive and because China offered unique economies of scale. Even now, with rising inflation in wages, China still has the advantage of those economies of scale.

　　“中國(guó)奇跡”很大程度上以下事實(shí)相關(guān)：在過(guò)去的十年間，中國(guó)通過(guò)生產(chǎn)世界其他地區(qū)都愿意購(gòu)買(mǎi)、價(jià)格低到無(wú)人能及的商品，實(shí)現(xiàn)了優(yōu)質(zhì)的增長(zhǎng)，以此推動(dòng)了中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張。個(gè)中原因在于，中國(guó)勞動(dòng)力既便宜又高產(chǎn)，同時(shí)中國(guó)具有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)。即使是現(xiàn)在，盡管工資日趨上漲，中國(guó)依然具備規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。

　　By contrast, most of the rest of Asia’s growth came the easy way – by putting up endless apartment towers that swell gross domestic product, but not in a sustainable way, thus paving the way for the Asian financial crisis.

　　相比之下，亞洲其他地區(qū)大多是通過(guò)便捷的途徑實(shí)現(xiàn)了增長(zhǎng)——即沒(méi)完沒(méi)了地蓋樓，以此推高GDP，但這不是一種可持續(xù)的方式，從而為那場(chǎng)亞洲金融危機(jī)埋下了隱患。

　　Yet mainland China has now become too dependent on the easy economic growth that comes from putting up concrete blocks which are then traded like sardines. Beijing today looks much more like Bangkok in 1997 than it looks like it did itself back then.

　　然而，中國(guó)內(nèi)地如今已經(jīng)變得過(guò)度依賴于那種便捷的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)途徑——堆砌像沙丁魚(yú)罐頭一樣的混凝土建筑。今日之北京與1997年之曼谷的相像程度，遠(yuǎn)甚于其與昔日自己相像的程度。

　　At the same time, the government has become much less effective in its attempts to bully the economy to move in the direction it desires. In the mid-1990s – the last time China faced rising prices and inflationary pressures – Zhu Rongji, then-premier, could use administrative measures far more effectively than is possible today because the economy is much more complex today than it was 15 years ago.

　　與此同時(shí)，政府已不能像以前那樣有效地按照自己意愿來(lái)駕馭經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行方向。上世紀(jì)90年代中期，也就是上次中國(guó)物價(jià)節(jié)節(jié)攀升、通脹壓力極大的時(shí)候，時(shí)任總理朱镕基能夠極為有效地采用行政手段，但放在今天則不太可能，因?yàn)槿缃竦闹袊?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)遠(yuǎn)比15年前復(fù)雜得多。

　　Today, all the choices involve difficult trade-offs: local governments need revenue from land sales since that is their main source of income and have a vested interest in keeping prices high. The interest on bank deposits is still negative, leading investors to put their money into property because they do not trust the stock market and there is not much else in which they can invest, as long as capital controls remain in place.

　　如今，擺在眼前的所有選擇都涉及到艱難的取舍：地方政府需要賣地收入，因?yàn)槟鞘撬麄兊闹饕杖雭?lái)源，所以維持高房?jī)r(jià)是他們的既得利益所在。銀行存款利率仍為負(fù)值，促使投資者把錢(qián)投到房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)上，因?yàn)樗麄儾恍湃喂墒?，而只要中?guó)繼續(xù)施行資本管制，他們除了這兩者以外就沒(méi)什么投資渠道。

　　There is a need for more housing. But it will not be met by the luxury flats that can now be seen in third- and fourth-tier cities where there is not the sort of rising income that could support that kind of high-end market.

　　中國(guó)需要更多的住房。但是，如今在三、四線城市都可見(jiàn)到的豪華住宅滿足不了這種需求，這些城市的收入增長(zhǎng)狀況，無(wú)法支撐那種高端市場(chǎng)。

　　Today, it is hard to know what the cost of all this actually will actually be.

　　目前，我們無(wú)法知道這一切究竟將會(huì)造成什么損害。

　　In the official sector, where ICBC itself dwells, rates are low and the cost of capital is, if anything, too cheap. Foreign investors are beginning to look elsewhere for opportunities since asset prices are so inflated, reflecting the fact that credit is still available. In India, by contrast, bank credit as a percentage of GDP is a mere 52 per cent.

　　在正統(tǒng)的放貸領(lǐng)域，即工行所處的這一塊，利率很低，資金成本低廉到簡(jiǎn)直可忽略不計(jì)。外國(guó)投資者正開(kāi)始去別處尋找機(jī)會(huì)，因?yàn)檫@里的資產(chǎn)價(jià)格過(guò)高，這說(shuō)明信貸仍然是可以獲得的。相比之下，印度銀行信貸占GDP的比例僅為52%。

　　Meanwhile, outside the official sector, where Huarong sits, the cost of capital is much higher.

　　另一方面，在正統(tǒng)放貸部門(mén)之外，即華融所在的行當(dāng)，資金成本則要高出許多。

　　But China will not always be awash with cash. It needs to spend more wisely today while capital is still abundant.

　　但是，中國(guó)不可能總是有大量資金。當(dāng)前，趁著資金仍然充裕，中國(guó)需要更明智地花錢(qián)。