A rebound in China's trade surplus to $31 billion in July the highest level since January 2009 seems likely to spark a new round of hand-wringing on the iniquities of an undervalued yuan. But before climbing on their soap box, politicians in the U.S. should consider the findings of new research from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

　　中國7月份貿(mào)易順差回升到315億美元，達(dá)到2009年1月以來的最高水平。這可能引發(fā)新一輪有關(guān)人民幣被不公平低估的歇斯底里抱怨。但在就此問題大抒己見之前，美國政界人士應(yīng)該考慮一下舊金山聯(lián)邦儲備銀行新近一份研究報告中的發(fā)現(xiàn)。

　　According to San Francisco Fed senior economist Galina Hale and research advisor Bart Hobijn, the share of Chinese produced goods in U.S. consumption is not nearly as high as is widely believed.

　　Brian Snyder/Reuters在舊金山聯(lián)邦儲備銀行高級經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家海爾（Galina Hale）和研究顧問霍布金（Bart Hobijn）看來，中國制造的商品在美國消費市場中所占份額遠(yuǎn)沒有普遍認(rèn)為的那么高。

　　Surveying data from the Commerce Department, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau, the pair finds that a full 88.5% of goods and services consumed by U.S. households is produced domestically. Of the 11.5% that is imported, goods made in China account for barely more than a quarter ─ or 2.7% of total U.S. consumption spending.

　　他們分析美國商務(wù)部（Commerce Department）、美國勞工統(tǒng)計局（Bureau of Labor Statistics）以及人口普查局（Census Bureau）的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)后發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國家庭消費的商品和服務(wù)中，88.5%是在美國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的。而剩余那11.5%的進(jìn)口部分中，中國制造商品所占比重勉強(qiáng)超過四分之一，也就是說只占美國總體消費支出的2.7%。

　　Even that overstates the true share of China's imports. The reason? Almost all consumer goods are the product of many hands, and properly accounting for what is made where further reduces the share of “made in China.”

　　就算上面這個數(shù)據(jù)也夸大了中國輸美商品在美國總體消費支出中的占比。原因何在？幾乎所有消費品的制造都涉及很多環(huán)節(jié)，準(zhǔn)確統(tǒng)計每一個環(huán)節(jié)在消費品零售價格中的占比會進(jìn)一步降低“中國制造”商品在美國總體消費支出中的占比。

　　Hale and Hobijn explain:

　　對此，海爾和霍布金解釋道：

　　Obviously, if a pair of sneakers made in China costs $70 in the U.S., not all of that retail price goes to the Chinese manufacturer. In fact, the bulk of the retail price pays for the transportation of the sneakers to the U.S, rent for the store where they are sold, profits for shareholders of the U.S. retailer, and the cost of marketing the sneakers. These costs include the salaries, wages and benefits paid to U.S. workers and managers who staff these operations.

　　顯然，如果一雙中國制造的運動鞋在美國要賣70美元，這70美元并不全歸中國制造商。事實上，零售價的大部分會用來支付把鞋運到美國的運費，運動鞋零售店的租金，給美國零售商股東的分紅以及運動鞋的營銷成本。這些成本包括向此過程涉及的美國工人和管理人員支付的薪金、工資和福利。

　　The San Francisco Fed's calculations show that on average 36% of the price of imported goods goes to U.S. companies and workers, and for goods imported from China that number is even higher:

　　舊金山聯(lián)邦儲備銀行的計算發(fā)現(xiàn)，平均來看，進(jìn)口商品價格的36%流向了美國企業(yè)和工人的腰包。對于從中國進(jìn)口的商品來說，這一比例甚至更高。

　　“On average， of every dollar spent on an item labeled ‘Made in China，’ 55 cents go for services produced in the U.S.，” Ms. Hale and Mr. Hobijn write. “In other words， the U.S. content of “Made in China” is about 55%. The fact that the U.S. content of Chinese goods is much higher than for imports as a whole is mainly due to higher retail and wholesale margins on consumer electronics and clothing than on most other goods and services.”

　　海爾和霍布金寫道：在“中國制造”的商品上每花一美元，平均就有55美分流向了美國本土服務(wù)業(yè)，換句話說，“中國制造”中的美國成分約為55%。中國商品中的美國成分之所以遠(yuǎn)高于美國總體進(jìn)口商品中的美國成分，主要是因為消費類電子產(chǎn)品和服裝的零售和批發(fā)利潤要高于大多數(shù)商品和服務(wù)。

　　It gets more complicated. Chinese made parts also go into the 88.5% of U.S. consumption spending devoted to goods made in the U.S. Adding it all up, the researchers conclude that the total share of “made in China” goods in U.S. household consumption is just 1.9%.

　　現(xiàn)在的問題就更復(fù)雜了。美國家庭在美國制造的商品上面的消費支出占總支出的88.5%，但其中也含有“中國制造”。把這些都算上的話，海爾和霍布金得出的結(jié)論是，“中國制造”的商品在美國家庭消費中所占的總份額僅為1.9%。

　　What does it all mean? There's good news and there's bad news. The good news is that the China threat that looms so large in U.S. political debate is overstated. China's exports as a share of U.S. consumption might have grown quickly, but they are still a small fraction of the total. U.S. workers and companies are also taking a fair chunk of change from the process.

　　這些數(shù)字到底意味著什么呢？答案是：喜憂參半。喜的是，在美國政治爭論中顯得如此可怕的中國威脅論是言過其實了。中國出口產(chǎn)品在美國消費總量中所占的比例或許增長迅速，但相對整體而言仍微不足道。美國雇員和企業(yè)也從中國出口中獲取了相當(dāng)大的利潤。

　　The bad news is that hopes of a stronger yuan creating more space for U.S. manufacturers to sell to the domestic market already overplayed appear even less credible. If most of the cost of “made in China” imports actually accrues to U.S. workers and companies, yuan appreciation will have only a limited impact on competitiveness.

　　憂的是，有人以為人民幣升值可在美國本土市場為美國制造商創(chuàng)造更大空間供其銷售產(chǎn)品(其實早已飽和)，這種期望似乎更不可靠了。如果“中國制造”的進(jìn)口商品的大部分成本實際上都流向了美國雇員和公司的腰包，那么人民幣升值僅會對美國制造商的競爭力產(chǎn)生有限影響。

　　The economic silver lining is that a small share for “made in China” also means a limited impact for China's inflation in pushing prices in the U.S. higher. Hale and Hobijn conclude:

　　從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度看，這種情況的一個好處是，“中國制造”占比較小還意味著中國通脹對推高美國商品價格的影響有限。海爾和霍布金總結(jié)道：

　　“China's 2011 inflation rate is close to 5%. If Chinese exporters were to pass through all their domestic inflation to the prices of goods they sell in the U.S., the personal consumption expenditure price index would only increase by 1.9% of this 5%… That would equal a 0.1 percentage point increase in the index.”

　　中國2011年的通脹率接近5%。如果中國出口商將國內(nèi)通脹全部轉(zhuǎn)嫁到出口至美國的商品價格中，美國的個人消費支出價格指數(shù)的增長也只會是這5%當(dāng)中的1.9%，相當(dāng)于該指數(shù)增加了0.1個百分點。

　　The U.S. might not be able to force China to revalue the yuan, but at least they will escape the inflationary consequences of China's super-charged growth.

　　美國可能無法逼迫中國重估人民幣，但他們至少可以躲過中國超速增長產(chǎn)生的通脹惡果。